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Abstract
Mid-nineteenth century Denmark was a center of Lutheran Chlistianity characterized by
dry, passionless, ritualism. All citizens were member of the state church, and thus
considered Chlistian, but the churches themselves did not proclaim the Gospel in a way
commensurate with their namesake, Mmiin Luther. Into this spilitual wasteland stepped
Soren Kierkegaard. An outspoken clitic of the Danish Church, Kierkegaard sought to
proclaim the true Christianity to the people of Denmark. Generally, Kierkegaard's
wlitings reflect the central theological tenets of the refol1ner himself, but many places in
his wliting appear to reflect some SOli of synergistic position with regards to salvation.
On the one hand, he admits that humans can do nothing towards salvation, but on the
other that a committed act of the will is necessary in one's relation to God. The goal of
this paper is to show that Kierkegaard affinned a legitimate personal freedom with regard
to salvation. It will also be shown that his affim1ation of this freedom does not mean that
he thought man could cooperate with God to effect salvation (synergism). These goals
will be achieved through an examination of the relevant material in the works of
Kierkegaard. Properly understood, those passages in the published works which appear
to affirm synergism really affinn no such position. It is not until 1852, after the
published corpus, that Kierkegaard begins to affinn synergism.
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Kierkegaard and the Freedom of the Will
Soren Kierkegaard is one of the most misunderstood and controversial thinkers in
modern history. He was bom in Denmark in 1813. The philosophical era into which he
was bom and grew up was the golden age of Gelman idealism. His own philosophical
thought, although difficult to place neatly in the flow ofthe history of philosophy, was
largely a response to the Hegelianism of his time. Hegelianism, as Kierkegaard saw,
touted universality over individuality. Kierkegaard's response was the radical emphasis
on individuality, on the self. It is in this sense that he can be made to fit into this peliod
of philosophical development.! Nevertheless, despite the histOlical placement of
Kierkegaard, he defies more specific categorizing and spums assimilation into a
philosophical school of thought of that time peliod?
It is precisely in the nature of his reaction to Hegelianism that Kierkegaard defies

classification. His response, which championed the individual over the collective,
quickly evolved into a Christian polemic. The Lutheran state church had long since
depmied iI'om the foundations of the faith as interpreted by the reformer Mmiin Luther
himself. Kierkegaard, commenting on the dismal state of affairs within the church, noted
that a Dane could live by plinciples antithetical to Christianity, in fact even deny the
existence of God, and still call himself a Christian and be given a Christian burial when
the time comes. 3 Kierkegaard thus aimed his pen at the Danish church, which he

I Frederick Copleston, A HistOJY ofPhilosophy, vol. 7. From the Post Kantian Idealists to Marx,
.Kierkegaard, Clnd Nietzsche (New York: Image Books, 1963), 337.

Roger Poole, "The Unknown Kierkegaard: Twentieth-Century Receptions," in The Cambridge
Companion to Kierkegoard, eds. Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998),48-75.
2

Soren Kierkegaard, The Point ofVielVfor Mv Work as All Author, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1962),22-23.

3
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believed was no representative oftme, biblical Christianity. So, his philosophical
individualism turned into a radical theological individualism in which the individual was
wholly committed to Chlist. He states in his joumal, "But before God, the infinite spirit,
all the millions who have lived and live now do not fonn a mass; he sees only
individuals.,,4 Therefore, Kierkegaard may be considered just as much a theologian as a
philosopher. And he was staunchly Lutheran in his theology. And as a Lutheran, he
held, among other things, that man had done and could do nothing good in order to merit
salvation. God does it all, and nothing concerning salvation can be attributed to man.
Conceming the relationship between God and man, he wlites, in his joumal:
DIVISIO
There is an infinite, radical, qualitative difference between God and man.
This means, or the expression for this is: the human person achieves
absolutely nothing; it is God who gives everything; it is he who blings f01ih a
person's faith, etc.
This is grace, and this is Christianity's major premise. (Xl A 59 [lP
2:1383])
Kierkegaard sees God and man as qualitatively distinct. His commentaries on the
relationship between man and God demonstrate his enmity toward both the speculative
philosophy of his day and the litualistic, impassionate church of Denmark. God can
neither be reached by a gradual process of the intellect nor by jumping through celiain
ecclesiastical hoops in a pmiicular order (baptism, confil111ation, marriage, and bmial).
Despite this entry and several other places in his works that echo this point, there
are just as many places where Kierkegaard seems to be an advocate of human freedom.

4Soren Kierkegaard, Journals alld Papers: A Selection, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Books,
1996), 506.
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In the same joumal entry in which he wlites that man and God are qualitatively different,
he adds:
SUBDIVISIO
Although, of course, there can be nothing meritOlious, unconditionally
nothing, in any action whatsoever, any more than faith could be melitorious ( for
then the DIVISIO or major premise is dissolved and we are in the minor premise),
this neveliheless does mean dming in childlikeness to be involved with God.
If the DIVISIO is everything, then God is so infinitely sublime that there
is no intrinsic or actual relationship between God and the individual human being.
Therefore attention must be paid scrupulously to the SUBDIVISIO,
without which the life of the single individual never gets off the ground. (X I A 59
[JP 2:1383])
To some it may seem that Kierkegaard's theology smacks of synergism. If this were in
fact the case, Kierkegaard would be less than Lutheran. Throughout his writings,
Kierkegaard clearly defines the freedom he posits, and it is well within Chlistian
Olihodoxy, and more pmiicularly within the Lutheran fold, at least when compared with
the so-called Danish Lutheran Church of his day. In reality, Kierkegaard both aHill11s
legitimate human freedom in salvation and rejects the idea that humans cooperate with
God's grace to achieve salvation (known as synergism).
Liberum Arbitruim
In a lengthy joumal entry in the later pmi of his life, dated 1849 (which is the
same year in which the above entry was penned), Kierkegaard 'mites:
There is a pious suspicion about subjectivity, that as soon as the least
concession is made to it will promptly become something melitOlious this is
why objectivity must be emphasized.
Fine. In order to constrain subjectivity, we are quite properly taught that
no one is saved by works, but by grace and corresponding to that - by faith.
Fine.
But am I therefore unable to do something myself with regard to becoming
a believer? Either we must answer this with an unconditioned "no," and then we
have fatalistic election by grace, or we must make a little concession. The point is
this - subjectivity is always under suspicion, and when it is established that we
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are saved by faith, there is immediately the suspicion that too much has been
conceded here. So an addition is made: But no one can give himself faith; it is a
gift of God I must pray for.
Fine, but then I myself can pray, or must we go further and say: No,
praying (consequently praying for faith) is a gift of God which no man can give to
himself; it must be given to him. And what then? Then to pray aright must again
be given to me so that I may rightly pray for faith, etc.
There are many, many envelopes - but there must still be one point or
another where there is a halt at subjectivity. Making the scale so large, so
difficult, can be commendable as a majestic expression for God's infInity, but
subjectivity cannot be excluded, unless we want to have fatalism. (X2 A 301 [JP
4:4551])
What is this "little concession" which must be made in order to avoid fatalism?
Kierkegaard calls is "subjectivity," and, as will be shown, there are many places where he
clearly speaks of human fl'eedom as having a role in salvation, but how great is this role,
how little is the concession?
In another joumal entry, this one dated 1852, Kierkegaard notes that one must die
to the world to become a Christian, and that dying is an "act of freedom."s Two other
entries,

x S 59 and 79 (JP 3: 3770 and 3774) assign a role to freedom in salvation, as does

a passage in Practice in Clzristianity.6 These are just a few of the passages where human
freedom in salvation is at1im1ed. These teachings have led some people to maintain that
Kierkegaard was in fact a synergist. Kierkegaard has been called an Arminian. 7 Evans,
while acknowledging that faith and sin-consciousness are not produced by acts of the
will, comes back and claims that they are nevertheless only produced in the individual if

5Soren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, vol. 3, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1970), entry 3769.
Soren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991), 171.

6

Timothy Jackson, "Am1inian Edification: Kierkegaard on Grace and Free Will," in The Cambridge
Companion to Kierkegaard, eds. Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino ( Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 252.

7
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the individual wills it. Perhaps this is Evans' understanding ofthe little "concession."
However, for Kierkegaard to be put in the ranks of the synergists, he would have to
espouse liberum arbitlium, because this view of the will is the foundation for synergism. 9
Evans calls this type of freedom "fonnal freedom."lo This is the freedom in which the
will is not influenced one way or another by any causal agent. The will is light in the
middle of the two options. Jackson, while he admits that Kierkegaard does not speak
highly of the concept ofliberum arbitlium, claims that Kierkegaard really only rejects
this concept when taken in isolation. I I In order to hold that Kierkegaard was a synergist,
one must elevate his teachings on freedom ofthe will above his teachings on grace and
man's relation to God. This is the elevation of the SUBDIVISIO over the DIVISIO, and
while Kierkegaard acknowledged that the two must be taken together, he definitely
asserted that, in the end, the DIVISIO must take precedence over the SUBDIVISIO.
After all, grace is Chlistianity's "major premise."
Trying to put Kierkegaard in the ranks of synergists by claiming that he did not
reject outright liberum arbitrium is to ignore what he wrote about the subject. In 1842-43
Kierkegaard wrote in his journal, "A perfectly disinterested will (equilibrium) is nothing,
a chimera ... " 12 In another journal entry he records, "Freedom means to be capable.

C. Stephen Evans, "Salvation, Sin and [-Iuman Freedom in Kierkegaard," in The Grace orGod and the
TYi!! orMan: The Casefor A I'm inian iSI11 , ed. Clark Pinnock (Minneapolis: Bethany I-louse Publishers,
1989),188.

8

9 Craig Q. Hinkson, "Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace. The Lutheran and Idealist Traditions in
His Thought." (Ph.D. diss .. University of Chicago, 1993). ISO.

10

Evans, 185.

II

Jackson, 249.

12 Soren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, vol. 2, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), entry 1241.
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Good and evil exist nowhere outside freedom, since this very distinction comes into
existence through freedom.,,13 Wliting under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis in
The Concept a/Anxiety, Kierkegaard asselis that liberum arbitrium "no more existed in

the world in the beginning than in a late period, because it is a nuisance for thought.,,14
Not even Adam was neutrally poised between the choices which represented freedom.
Adam's will, while originally not in bondage to sin, was not neutral in the sense that it
was unaffected and uninfluenced by something. Hinkson notes, " ... wherever one tums in
Kierkegaard's writings one encounters the denial that freedom is ever indifferent to the
object that it chooses; either it immediately chooses the good and is matelially
detennined by that choice, or it has chosen evil and become irrevocably stamped
t11ereb y.".·1 -S
Kierkegaard maintains that "sin came into the world by a s1n.,,16 This sin was a
free act, but it occurred precisely because of Adam's captivation with his own freedom to
choose between: liberum arbitlium. Haufniensis writes, "Henc"e anxiety is the dizziness
of ffeedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom
looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to suppOli itself. Freedom
succumbs in this dizziness ... .In that very moment everything is changed, and freedom,
when it again lises, sees that it is guilty." 17

13

Journals and Papers, vol. 2, trans., entry 1249.

Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept ofAnxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1980).49.

14

15

Hinkson. 152. (emphasis his)

16

The Concept o{Anxiety, 32.

17 The

Concept o!Anxiety, 6l.
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Thomte comments, "Kierkegaard accepts the dogma that original or inherited sin
is guilt." I 8 Yet Kierkegaard asserts that inhelited sin itself is paradoxical and that the
only way sin can be understood to any extent is through Christianity. 19 In the Fragments,
Kierkegaard, wliting under the guise of Johannes Climacus, addresses the bondage of the
will which affects man and how setiously the will is affected. Man's choice to sin was a
free choice, but one that was ilTevocable. Freedom came at a price, as did unfreedom,
and for both the price was the soul's fi-ee choice and the sUlTender of the choice. Once
the plice was paid, the deal was final. There could be no refunds, so to speak. By his
tl'ee choice, man's will was made a slave to sin and thus unable to come to God; indeed,
it is unwilling to come to God. So bad is the COlTuption, that the will actually wars
against the Truth.~o In no sense is it now in the position tieely to choose between good
and evil.
So it can be seen that Kierkegaard vehemently denies liberum arbitrium yet
maintains a freedom which has real matelial content and is detem1ined by that content.
These claims about the two types of freedom extend all the way back to Adam and can be
seen to continue into the present. So, in order to see how this matelial freedom relates to
grace (and still exists), we must always keep in mind the assertion that the major premise
in Christianity is grace. All of Kierkegaard's statements about freedom's place in
salvation must be subordinated to, and understood in the light

ot~

his teachings on grace.

IS Reidar Thomte. Kierkegaard's Philosophy o/Religion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1948),
164.

19JoLl177als (flld Papers, vol. 2, entry 1530.
20 Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992), 15- 17.
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The Necessity and Primacy of Grace
In the joumals Kierkegaard acknowledges that man is saved by grace (X3 A 269,
X 5 A 64, Xe A 182). This grace is God doing all in salvation; man does nothing which

merits this grace or aids it. Thus grace is necessary for salvation, and it is necessary
precisely because of the qualitative distinction between man and God. This distinction is
a result of a qualitative leap away from God, which is sin. In Sickness unto Death,
Kierkegaard writes, "As a sinner, man is separated from God by the most yawning
qualitative abyss. ,,21
In order for a man to come to ChTist and be saved, the gap must be bridged.
Recall that only through the revelation which is Chlistianity can sin be understood. In
Fragments, Climacus writes, "The teacher, then, is the god himself, who, acting as the

occasion, prompts the leamer to be reminded that he is untruth and is that through his
own fault. But this state - to be untruth and to be that through one's own fault - what can
we call it? Let us call it sin. 22 This revelation of sin-consciousness is an act of grace, and
the consciousness of sin is absolutely necessary to becoming a Chlistian. In fact, only by
this way can one enter into to Christianity.23
The OtIense
The individual must encounter Chlist in the light way in order for the revelation
of sin-consciousness to

OCCUr.

24

However, in order to reveal that truth to man and to

reveal Himself as the Absolute, it was necessary for the One outside of space and time to

11

Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death. trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Books. 1989). 155.

11

Fragments, 15.

13Practice in ChristianiZv, 67-68.
14

"Salvation. Sin, ... ," 188.

Kierkegaard 12

come into both space and time. As Evans argues, "In developing these concepts Climacus
suggests that the God's historical appearance would be essential if a total transformation
of the person is to be effected. ,,25 Yet this is inherently paradoxical to the natural man
because his fallen reason cannot comprehend the concept of the God-Man. Climacus
asselis, "Defined as the absolutely different, it [the Paradox] seems to be at the point of
being disclosed, but not so, because the understanding cannot even think the absolutely
different ... ,,26
As Evans explains, "The Paradox is fundamentally above reason, not
understandable (and thus if reason does not recognize its limits, the paradox will
conflict).,,27 Sin, although it stems from the will, has so cOlTupted the intellect that
natural reason cannot comprehend the paradox and thus takes offense at it. AntiClimacus describes the situation:
Essentially offense is related to the composite of God and man, or to the Godman .... It is either in relation to the loftiness that one is offended ... or the
offense is in relation to the lowliness ... In the first f01111, the offense comes in
such a way that I am not at all offended at the lowly man, but at his wanting me to
believe that he is God. And if I have already believed this, then the offense comes
from the other side, that he is supposed to be God - he, this lowly, powerless man
28
who ... is capable of doing nothing.
It is offensive to fallen man that he is untruth and that he is to blame for that

situation. And it is equally offensive to consider that God came to emih in order to reveal
this and to rectify the problem. Another aspect of the offense occasioned by the Paradox
is seen in the kel10sis passage in Philippians 2. The Paradox dies. Not only does he die,

25

Evans. Fragments and Postscript .... 25.

26

Philosophical Fragments, 45.

27

Evans, Kierkeg{l([rd's Fragments ([nd PostscnjJt. 238.

19

Practice in Christianity, 81-82.
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but he dies for fallen man. The loftiness and lowliness are again involved. One might be
offended that such a lofty man would die willingly. Conversely, one may be offended
because the death of a lowly man is said to accomplish so much, even the salvation ofthe
entire world. When confronted with the scene desclibed by Anti-Climacus, fallen human
reason simply cannot comprehend it. It is foolishness.
The very fact that there is even a problem, sin, is also cause for offense. The
Paradox came, but He came for a reason, to reconcile men to Himself. But the very fact
that reconciliation is needed is likewise offensive to man. Sin is that qualitative
difference which both separates man from God and prevents man from even realizing that
there is a qualitative difference. The very revelation ofthis qualitative difference, which
must come from the Paradox, is oiTensive. Hemlann Diem wlites, "Instead, this
revelation encounters him as a paradox that challenges not only a man's intellect, but his
entire existence ... it always involves the possibility that the man to whom it comes will
not believe it, but instead by offended by it.,,29
Kierkegaard remarks that what is crucial to understanding this offense at sin is the
Christian specification: before God. Beiore God one stands alone as an individual, an
entity in oneself, not as mere pmi of a greater whole. As a result, sin is shown truly to be
one's own sin against God; and yet the true impOliance of the individual is also revealed.
And it is this, too, that the natural man cannot stand. He is offended:
because it [Christianity] is too exalted for him, because he cannot make sense of
it, because he cannot be open and frank in the face of it, and therefore must have
it removed, made into nothing, into madness and nonsense, for it is as if it were
about to choke him.30

19

Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard: All Introduction, (Richmond: John Knox Press. 1967),68.

30The Sickness Unto Death, 118.
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The Order of Salvation

In order to overcome the offense at the Paradox, man must have faith. But faith is
something that can only come from God. It is the condition that is necessary to "come to
an understanding with this paradox ... ,,31 Climacus continues by giving a basic
descliption of the process by which one understands the Paradox via the granting ofthe
condition of faith:
It occurs when the understanding and the paradox happily encounter each other in
the moment, when the understanding steps aside and the paradox gives itselt~ and
the third something, the something in which this occurs (for it does not occur
through the understanding, which is discharged, or through the paradox, which
gives itself consequently in something), is that happy passion to which we shall
now give a name, although for us it is not a matter of the name. We shall call it
faith. This passion, then, must be that abovementioned condition that the paradox
provides. Let us not forget this: if the paradox does not provide the condition,
then the leamer is in possession of it; but ifhe is in possession of the condition,
then he is eo ipso himself in truth, and the moment is only the moment of
.
32
occasIOn.

If the leamer had the truth in him already and the condition were not given by the

Paradox, one would be back in the Socratic framework and no' longer in Christianity.
This statement by Climacus is evidence against synergism because Kierkegaard is saying
the Paradox (i.e. the God in time) must give faith; that faith comes from olltside of man.
The only altemative to this is faith already being inside man, and this is not Christianity.
Fmihen11ore, man does not and cannot ask for this condition, because, as Climacus points
out, his understanding, or reason, must "step aside" or be "discharged" in order for faith
to make room for the Paradox.

31

Fragments, 59.

31 Fragments,

59.
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As Climacus points out, faith is not a knowledge. 33 This conception of faith is

consistent with what the author of Hebrews wlites about faith: "Faith is the substance of
things hoped for, the evi dence of things not seen." (Heb. 11: 1) The word "seen" in the
Greek could also be translated "understood. ,,34 To Kierkegaard, as to the author of
Hebrews, faith is the evidence of God, who cannot be directly understood. Faith is the
vehicle for salvation, not human reason, in that while the Paradox itself cannot be
understood, the reality and impOliance of the Paradox is understood by faith.
Actually, Climacus calls faith a "paradox" as well. He even calls it a "miracle."
He writes, "Faith itself is a wonder, and everything that is true of the paradox is also true
offaith.,,35 The follower realizes that without faith, he would not be able to accept the
truth that is the Paradox. Fmihem1ore, that follower realizes that he did nothing even to
get or eam faith, for it was by the faith that was given him that he realized he was
untruth, a state which automatically precluded him from being able to merit or ask for the
condition.
This giving of the condition is logically antecedent to the revelation of one's
sinfulness. Climacus states, "So it is with the follower who knows that without the
condition he would have seen nothing, inasmuch as the first thing he understood was that
he himself was untruth.,,36 Recall that this realization of being untruth is the

33

Fragments, 62.

Robert Young. Young's Analytical Concordance to the Bible, (Peabody. MA: Hendrickson Publishers),
851.

34

35

Fragments, 65.

36

Fragments, 65.
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consciousness of sin. In fact, faith and sin-consciousness can be viewed as two sides of
the same coin.
Conversion, for Climacus, is that change which took place in the individual after
he received the condition. Because the condition also makes the man realize that he is
untruth through his own fault, the conversion experience is also characterized by
repentance. Climacus states, "Let us call such sorrow repentance, for what else is
repentance, which does indeed look back, but neveliheless in such a way that precisely
thereby it quickens its pace toward what lies ahead!,,37 Camell notes that this repentance
comes from the realization that " ... life is nothing without God.,,38
Climacus notes that conversion means that the person has become qualitatively
ditIerent. Salvation is a radical change in the person so that he becomes another than he
was before. This "new person," as Climacus calls it, has become that way as result of a
transition he calls "rebilih." He writes: "Inasmuch as he was in untruth and now along
with the condition receives the truth, a change takes place in him like the change from
"not to be" to "to be." ... Let us call this transition rebirth ...

'9
,,~

To summarize, an unsaved man is given the condition, faith, which is a kind of
"seeing" ("faith's autopsy" or "self-seeing," Climacus calls it). By this condition he
understands the truth, which is Chlist. Climacus also says that he "receives" the truth by
this condition. In this moment also comes the knowledge of sin, which, again because of
the condition, causes the person to repent. Conversion can, then, be described as tuming

37

Fragments, 18-19.

Edward John Carnell. The Burden o(,Sorel1 Kierkeguard, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1965), 144.

38

39

Fragl11 ents, 19.
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to God and thus away from sin; it is a qualitative lifestyle change. As Climacus put it,
"he was turned around.,,4o But the change is more than one oflifestyle, it is really like

stmiing life anew, and thus is called the rebirth. So rebilih coincides with conversion. As
one turns towards God and away from sin, one embarks on a new direction and is
"reboill."
Freedom: Its Necessity and Role
It is clear then, that Kierkegaard makes a proper defense of his own DIVISIO.

Salvation is initiated and completed by God. Yet it must be remembered that the
SUBDIVISIO cannot be left out. Human freedom fits somewhere into salvation.
However, while the SUBDIVISIO is defended, it is done so in the context ofthe
DIVISIO. It should be kept in mind that after the published works (1852), towards the
end of Kierkegaard's life, his thinking does begin to shift and his wliting contains a
synergistic tone. Hinkson correctly points this out, but neveliheless insists that "the
weight of evidence prior to the final period indicates that SK has not always asclibed so
much to man, and so little to God.,,4! Kierkegaard is sure to properly subordinate the
SUBDIVISIO to the DIVISIO throughout his published corpus. Even so, despite the fact
that the SUBDIVISIO is secondary, Kierkegaard still issues a powerful defense for it. He
views human freedom and its implications as being essential to the Chlistian faith. His
defense of freedom is just as well thought out as his defense of grace; in fact the two go
hand-in-hand, as freedom must be understood within the context of grace. It is to his
defense of the SUBDIVISIO, as subordinately related to the DIVISIO, that we now go.

40

Fragments, 18.

41

Hinkson, 159n, emphasis his.
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Kierkegaard lays much of the foundation for his doctline of human freedom in his
joumal. One particular entry reads, "The most tremendous thing conceded to man is choice, freedom. If you want to rescue and keep it, there is only one way - in the very
same second unconditionally in full attachment [abandonment, devotion, or submission]
give it back to God and yourself with it.,,42 In fact Kierkegaard goes so far as to say that
freedom is a necessity. He even links the necessity of freedom with the doctrines of
creation ex nihilo and the omnipotence of God. His joumal entry reads:
... only omnipotence can make [a being] independent, ... only omnipotence can
truly succeed in this [making man free]. Therefore if a man had the slightest
independent existence over against God (with regard to materia). then God could
not make him free. Creation out of nothing is once again the Almighty's
expression for being able to make [a being] independent. He to whom lowe
absolutely everything, although he still absolutely controls everything, has in fact
made me independent. If in creating man God himselflost a little of his power,
43
then precisely what he could not do would be to make man independent.
Freedom is necessitated by an omnipotent creator. Denying freedom is denying God's
omnipotence and his ability to create at all.
Defending Cll1istianity
This line of thought especially was a reaction against Hegelianism. Although
God's sovereignty and man's freedom appear to contradict one another, they actually
must be simultaneously affim1ed in order for Cll1istianity to stand. Hinkson provides an
insight into the way this is so, especially in relation to the philosophical milieu of the
time.

41

Journals and Papers. vol. 2, entry 1261.

43

Journals ({nd Papers. vol. 2 entry 1251.
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He comments that an overemphasis on either one would reduce God to mere immanence
and destroy the qualitative distinction between God and man:
An emphasis upon grace that would neglect man's fi'eedom issues in a
monism that denies God's power to create entities distinct from himself; in effect,
it makes of all things an ultimately homogenous divinity and therewith posits the
dependency of God upon his creation. Conversely, an emphasis upon fi'eedom
that would neglect God's grace issues in a monadism wherein man assumes the
status of a demi-divinity.44
Kierkegaard's theology does not scramble to rethink Olihodoxy to defend against a new
challenger. Rather it can be seen that Olihodox Cll1istianity is strongest when all of its
doctrines are affil111ed, even those which appear to contradict one another.
Defending Monergism
Kierkegaard affirms the traditional Refol111ation teaching that God's regenerative
work precedes man's faith. This must be upheld in order to avoid synergism. Yet this
would seem to imply that grace is being "forced" upon man, which is, in fact, what AntiClimacus affil111s:
"But if the essentially Christian is something so telTifying and appalling, how in
the world can anyone think of accepting Chlistianity?" Very simply and, if you
wish that also, very Lutheranly: only the consciousness of sin can force one, if I
dare to put it that way (from the other side grace is the force), into this hOlTor.
And at that very same moment the essentially Christian transforms itself into and
is sheer leniency, grace, love, and mercy. Considered in any other way
Christianity is and must be a kind of madness or the greatest horror. Admittance
is only through the consciousness of sin; to want to enter by any other road is high
treason against Christianity.45
As Anti-Climacus points out, there must be a tranSf0l111ation of the man "before"
he accepts the "radical cure," and that transfoll11ation begins with the quickening of sin-
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Hinkson, 158. (emphasis his)

45practice in Christianity. 67-68. emphasis added
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conSCIOusness. David Gouwens states succinctly: "Sin-consciousness, Kierkegaard often
insists, is the prerequisite to faith; ... ,,46 Both are God's work, and not our own work.
This commitment to Lutheran monergism can be seen in a joumal entry in which
Kierkegaard states, "Heterodoxly one may say that conversion precedes and conditions
the forgiveness of sins; Olihodoxly one may say: the forgiveness of sins precedes
conversion and strengthens men truly to be convelied.,,47 That is to say, from the human
perspective, we tum to God in repentance and faith, and He, in tum, grants the
forgiveness of sin. But in actual fact, our tuming is preceded by a regenerative work of
the Holy Spilit that causes us to receive forgiveness with joy and gratitude. Conversion
and regeneration do occur simultaneously, though regeneration possesses logical priority
in the ordo salutis. God forgives (wipes away) sin, thereby ending the separation between
man and God, and a change occurs in the person as a result of this.
Climacus, as we have seen, stresses that this complete transfol1nation ofthe
individual takes place in the moment. Robeli C. Roberts adequately eases any tension
that may mise between man's view and God's view. He writes, "So even if: at the
moment of conversion, it looks phenomenologically as though one had, at least pmiially,
by effOli come to faith, still one COlTects this judgment retrospectively by a dogmatic
standard: God is entirely the author of one's faith.,,48
If all this is true, what happened to freedom? It is still affimled. Man has a
choice, but yet it is not a choice.

David J. Gouwens. Kierkegaard as ReligioLls Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996).
150.
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Kierkegaard's joul11al reads:
Is it not a peculiar yet profound use oflanguage that someone may say:
There is absolutely no question here of any choice - I choose this and
that. ... Fmihel111ore, Christianity can say to a man: You shall choose the one thing
needful, but in such a way that there must be no question of any choice - that is, if
you fool around a long time, then you are not really choosing the one thing
needful; like the kingdom of God, it must be chosenfirst. Consequently there is
something in relation to which there must not be, and by definition there cannot
be, a choice, and yet there is a choice. Consequently, the very fact that there is no
choice expresses the tremendous passion or intensity with which one chooses.
Can there be a more accurate expression for the fact that freedom of choice is
only a fonnal condition of freedom and that emphasizing freedom of choice as
such means the sure loss of freedom? The content offloeedom is decisive for
freedom to such an extent that the very truth of freedom of choice is: there must
be no choice, even though there is a choice. (X2 A 428 [2: 1261])
The freedom to which Kierkegaard refers cannot be liberum arbitrium inasmuch as it
never existed. It is material freedom, the freedom detel111ined by its object. Grace is
forcing one to a decision. In the joumal entry above, it is clear that grace has so
compelled the will to choose Freedom, Christ, that although there at first seems to be a
compulsion (no choice), there was in the realest sense a choice, because that choice was
detennined by its object, which was the Truth. Man is free because he chose FreedomItself. Hinkson clmifies: "Through the deprivation offonnal freedom (the elimination of
all viable options, save one) man comes into possession of material-that is to say, realfreedom, and finds himself able willingly to choose that to which he had hithelio only
· 1y sub
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Recall the joumal entry in which Kierkegaard states that the only way really to
have freedom is to sUlTender it completely in the moment it is given. It is grace which
gives this freedom, as well as the very ability to give freedom back. The regenerated
man, having been given the condition and the revelation of sinfulness, must realize that

49Hinkson, 167. emphasis his
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the only response is to embrace the "radical cure." In that moment in which all of this
occurs, he must take the "leap of faith." Evans notes, ""The leap is simply Climacus'
metaphOlical way of emphasizing that the decision to become a Christian is a choice, a
free personal decision.,,5o
He must come to God in that moment, for only then can he be free. It is when he
pauses to ponder fonnal freedom that he has really lost freedom. Kierkegaard wlites:
Alas, but man is not sufficiently spirit. He thinks: Since the choice is left to men,
I will take my own time and/irst of all think it over very earnestly. Tragic anticlimax! "Eamestness" is precisely to choose God immediately and "first of all."
And so man lies there and conjures with a phantom: freedom of choice, whether
he has it or whether he does not, etc. --- and even does it in a scientific-scholarly
way. He does not notice that he has missed freedom .... By staring fIxedly at
"freedom of choice" instead of choosing, he loses both freedom and freedom of
choice ... .If the sight of what is conceded to you tempts you, if you surrender to
the temptation and look with selfish craving at freedom of choice, then you lose
your freedom. 5I
Words such as "eamest" and "first of all" in the passage emphasize the subj ectivity of the
choice. What is more, it must be done "immediately." This leap is a passionate one;
faith is a matter of passion, and certainly not of reason, for it is reason which causes one
to contemplate fonnal freedom and thus lose freedom. As Johannes de Silentio says in
Fear and Trembling, "faith begins precisely where thinking leaves off.,,51

This passionate subjectivity, or human willing, is that for which Kierkegaard
mms. Remember that Climacus called faith a "happy passion." Eliciting this passion is
the "compulsion" of grace which has undergone so total a transfom1ation that it is

C. Stephan Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragmen/s and Postscript: The Religiolls Philosophy O(Johw111es
Climacus, (Atlantic Highlands. NJ: Humanities Press, 1983),274.
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expelienced as the opportunity to do good. Hinkson identifies this as a "Gestalt-shift,,,S3
and writes: " ... through the constraining operation of grace, man's will is transferred from
the evil to the good so that he is able to choose the latter.,,54 Evans goes so far as to
define matelial freedom itself as "the ability to be the kind of person God is calling an
indi vidual to be."

55

So, there is freedom, but not synergism. The key to explaining that Kierkegaard's
position is not synergism is demonstrating three things: 1) that Kierkegaard held that man
could do nothing to merit salvation, 2) that Kierkegaard taught that the human will can
contribute nothing toward salvation independently of grace, and 3) that Kierkegaard did
not espouse a cooperation between the pre-regenerate will and grace in salvation.
Man cannot merit salvation because he is untruth and positioned polemically
against the truth. There is no independent working of the will because there is no liberum
arbitrilll71, which would be necessary for man's will to work independently of God's, yet

Kierkegaard tells us it never existed. Thus, it is all God workihg in man. FUlihennore,
the will is not working alongside grace because without grace it would not have known
anything to begin with. Instead of cooperating with grace, human will first comes to be
as a result of grace. Thus grace's sole efficacy in making the will effectual is maintained
and man's freedom is preserved. 56 This free choice is just the will ratifying "the good in
which it stands:,s7 and then having the ability to continue in the faith.

DHinkson, 167-168.
5"Hinkson.167.
SS"Salvation, Sin, ... ," 185.
56 Hinkson, 169-170.
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The "little concession" really does seem to be "little" in light of an understanding
of freedom and the necessity thereof. It is quite apparent that the concession is needed
because the will must make a choice. This choice is easy to affinn once it is realized that
what is conceded is "the choice that isn't a choice".
Conclusion
The issue of man's free will and God's sovereignty in the effecting of salvation is
an issue that has been around since the dawn of Christianity and will be around until the
retul11 of the Lord. In dealing with this issue, many theologians have emphasized one
side of the issue at the expense of the other. This has often led to extremism on either
side, characterized by more of a theoretical theology than a practical one. However, this
is not the case with Soren Kierkegaard.
While it may seem that he emphasized what he called the minor premise of
Christianity (daring in a childlike way to be involved with God) over the major premise
(the grace of God), he actually maintained a sound and systematic doctline of salvation
based on these premises. For sure, it is easy to get caught up in all ofKierkegaard's
material regarding the freedom that man has and his responsibility toward God.
Nevertheless, Kierkegaard never gives man any credit over against God. In fact, a good
summation of his view on man is a one-liner from Either/Or 11. The sennon that
concludes the book is entitled, "That which is edifying in the thought that in relation to
God, we are always in the wrong."S8 As loyal to the doctrines of Luther and the New
Testament as he was, Kierkegaard always sought to maintain a practical theology. And
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Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944),
339.
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there is no better doctlinal controversy than this to call attention to the doctrinal
cOlTectness and practical applicability of Ki erkegaard , teaching.
While never affill11ing synergism, Kierkegaard neveliheless championed a
personal act of freedom in salvation. Unlike most who uphold some freedom, he rejected
liberum arbitrium. By accentuating matelial freedom and by emphasizing a logical (and
thus simultaneous) order of salvation over a chronological one, Kierkegaard assured a
balance between the divine and human agents in salvation. These main points were what
truly enabled him to develop his teachings on the minor premise while still recognizing
the primacy of the major premise. However, this balance did not take the form of
crediting anything to man' s will. He never affill11ed any human merit in salvation or the
operation of the will independently of grace.
It is unfOliunate that Kierkegaard is grossly misunderstood by so many. Far from

being the anti-Christian inationalist so many people take him for, Kierkegaard was a
skilled theologian and philosopher who has a great deal to offer the 21 st century church.
His teachings on grace and the freedom of the will especially would add a great deal to
the CUlTent theological discussion among leading evangelicals. Whereas there are some
already taking advantage of his works, they are in the minOlity. Mainstream
evangelicalism, as well as the Chlistian church as a whole, should discover the true Soren
Kierkegaard, the defender of grace and childlike faith.
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